

Chapter 3

The Military Clauses of the Paris Peace Treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

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Introduction

The liberation of Europe started with Stalingrad and the landing in Italy in the Summer of 1943. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had not originally prepared the partition of Europe into spheres of interest. From the Autumn of 1943 onwards, by establishing an European Advisory Committee (EAC) in London, by jointly formulating armistice terms, and by setting up the Allied Control Commissions for Italy, then for Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary, they made an attempt to agree on a common policy. In October 1944, the British recognised the military dominance of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, but in their view this did not imply the introduction of Soviet-type systems.

The agreement between Churchill and Stalin on the division by percentage of war-time influence was an interim arrangement of military character for participation in the Allied Control Commissions, a compromise which in practice was ended with the three-power conference at Yalta - although the parties abided by the bargain later as well. The aim defined in the declaration of the 11th of February 1945 on liberated Europe was not division into spheres of interest but political coordination among the three powers, the establishing of democratic institutions and the restoration of lost sovereignty, with a view to forming provisional governments comprising all democratic parties. This was to be followed by free elections and stable governments in harmony with the will of the people.

The victorious powers considered three-power cooperation indispensable not only to the conduct of the war, but to a peace settlement and to the drafting of peace treaties as well. National governments implied coalitions uniting all anti-fascist forces in the East European countries. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union believed that such democratic multi-party systems would survive for about ten to fifteen years. Soviet strategic dominance in Eastern Europe and the priority of Soviet security interests were recognised by the British in the Autumn of 1944, by the Americans at the Foreign Minister's Conference in Moscow in December 1945. This came after the Soviets had conceded the priority of the Western Allies in Italy in the Spring of 1944, and in Japan by the Autumn of 1945.

Conflicts between the Great Powers arose from the fact that they were unable to map out a common European policy. The strength of the anti-fascist coalition proved sufficient to ensure peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland before the end of 1946, but great-power cooperation broke down in the discussion of the central problems -- the treaties with Germany and Austria.

The Soviet government's interests in the territories that were brought under military control was different. It did not tolerate any meddling by the U.K. or the U.S. with regard to the creation of governments and communist dominance in the domestic affairs of

Poland, Rumania or Bulgaria. Indeed, the control of these territories gave the Soviet Union access to the heart of Germany and the Mediterranean. Elections were held in the Autumn of 1946 or the Spring of 1947, but the struggle in these countries was decided in advance by election fraud and police interference, by the ousting of opposition parties from political life, by exploiting the Soviet military presence, and (in the case of Rumania) by means of reparations.

The British -- and later the Americans -- put up with the existence of security zones that differed from their 1943 ideas, but they did not accept the principle of exclusive Soviet influence. In their interpretation, influence might be wielded by the West in Eastern Europe and by the Soviets in Western Europe. With regards to the main strategic lines, however, the Soviets interpreted influence in accordance with the precedent established in 1943 by the Western Allies in Italy.

In the Autumn of 1945 and the Spring of 1946, three countries -- of minor strategic importance to the Soviet Union -- Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were able to hold free elections; the communist parties of the first two countries did very badly. Until the end of 1946 and early 1947, Stalin did not consider communist dominance to be important, rather he wanted the governing parties in those countries to pursue friendship towards the Soviet Union. At that time, the presence of Soviet troops was not crucial. They withdrew from Czechoslovakia in December 1945 and from Bulgaria towards the end of 1947. Moreover, troop withdrawals from Austria and Hungary were also under consideration during preparations for an Austrian Peace Treaty in early 1947.

Soviet foreign policy between 1943 and 1947 relied on the allied Slav states: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland. It centred around a possible future German threat. The Moscow agreement of December 1943 between Stalin and Benes served as a model for pacts of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Accession to this alliance was made possible for the defeated states (Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary) by bilateral agreements with Moscow and with one another in 1948.

The territorial status of the Soviet Union's prospective allies, the limitation of their military and economic sovereignty were regulated, in addition to bilateral arrangements, by the peace treaties agreed to by the British and American governments. Defeated Rumania lost Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Southern Dobrogea, but was allowed to regain Northern Transylvania; the frontiers drawn up at Trianon in 1920 remained valid for Hungary -- with the loss of an additional three villages on the right bank of the Danube which formed a Czechoslovak bridgehead at Pozsony (Bratislava-Pressburg). On the other hand, Bulgaria -- which had been a Nazi satellite - increased her territory after the war. Through the recognition of the continued validity of the Rumanian-Bulgarian agreement of Craiova (7th of September 1940), it could retain Southern Dobrogea.

But no fairer treatment was extended to the countries allied to the Soviet Union. Poland received German territory in compensation for the parts ceded to the Soviet Union, but Czechoslovakia -- another victor -- was compelled in June 1945 to yield the Carpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union. Thus a Soviet-Hungarian frontier came into existence. The strength of the armed forces of the defeated countries was limited; Soviet

troops were stationed in Rumania and Hungary in order to maintain lines of communication with the Soviet zone in Austria; the two countries paid \$ 300 million each in reparations. Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as, from Hungary, and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.

The post-war new democratic start was coupled with landslide changes and huge movements of populations. The Central and Southeast European democratic systems came into being in keeping with the intentions of the Great Powers; the decisive role in their birth was played by the Soviet Union since the countries concerned -- except Yugoslavia -- had not themselves forced the German army out of their territory. When negotiating over Hungary in December 1945, Stalin told U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes that "the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it wanted there;" yet elections were not won by the Communists but by another party. This proved true for the whole region. The Soviet Prime Minister was of the opinion that to maintain the three-power alliance, the Soviet Union had exercised moderation or applied a self denying device by accepting multi-party systems and free elections, since it could have introduced a Soviet system immediately after the occupation of Eastern Europe.

The war-time alliance had definitively come to an end by the Spring of 1947 when negotiations over a German peace treaty ended in failure; this eliminated any considerations that might have moderated Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. The consequences are well-known. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were followed by Cominform. Democracy in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was suppressed in 1948; Eastern Europe introduced a Soviet-type system, and all states (except Yugoslavia) became part of the Soviet alliance.

The Council of Foreign Ministers

At the end of the war, the allied Great Powers did not yet have any complete and jointly accepted plan for the elimination of armistice regimes and European settlement. The preconditions, the principles of procedure, the order of discussions and even the scope of the drafting powers were determined after long diplomatic battles between the three powers. It was in the course of these debates that the parties agreed upon the nature of the treaties, the venues and dates of the peace talks and above all, they took important decisions on restoring sovereignty and designating the final political frontiers of the defeated states.

The first agreement reached at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference between the heads of states and governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain was about the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers that represented the five great powers:

"As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be

utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.”¹

The principles of procedure and the order of the five peace treaties agreed upon played a decisive role in the drafting of the peace treaties.

It was believed that the five peace treaties could be finished within months. Since, however, there was no adequate German government to conclude the peace treaty, the solution of the central issue of a European settlement had to be postponed, until the conclusion of the *Final Settlement* (and not a peace treaty) with Germany on September 12, 1990.

The three governments attending the Berlin Conference considered it their primary task to prepare the Italian Peace Treaty. Due to *order of discussions* of the five peace treaties adopted by the Berlin Conference -- Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland -- the Italian question enjoyed priority while among the so-called Balkan Peace Treaties (Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian), the Rumanian Peace Treaty had been given priority. The fact that the cases of Italy and the other “ex-enemy” states had been linked with each other at the Berlin Conference was the result of Soviet diplomacy. Despite their different war records, the above countries had been given *uniform judgment* and their “unsettled situations” were to be settled at the same time.

The Berlin Conference specified the concrete circle of the states to draft the peace frontier. “For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those states which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy state concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.”²

The Peace Treaty for Italy had been drafted by the British, American, Soviet and French Foreign Ministers; the Peace Treaty for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the *Soviet, American and British*, and the peace treaty for Finland by the Soviet and British Foreign Ministers. In Paris, at the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (April 25, 1946), this ruling was modified. France took part in the negotiations of the Balkan treaties, though in practice confined her participation to suggestions and advice.

The Peace Aims of the Great Powers in 1945

Foreign Secretary Eden summarised the British-Soviet debates on Balkan issues to Churchill as early as May 25, 1945. Eden stated that “our aim in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary was to secure their evacuation by the Red Army and the establishment of independent governments.”³ The Foreign Office proposed *the early conclusion of peace*

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin 1945*, hereafter *FRUS* 1945, The Conference of Berlin II. p. 1500.

² *FRUS* 1945. The Conference of Berlin II. p. 1500.

³ L. Woodward, *History of British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, vol. III., London, 1961, pp. 58-78.

treaties with the three countries concerned. An office meeting was held on the 7th of June to consider arrangements necessary for the negotiations of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. It was thought that the Russians would inevitably demand the right to maintain military bases and troops in the countries concerned. The question arose whether it would be appropriate that positions to this effect should be included in the treaties. It was pointed out that if the British argued against their inclusion, the Russians would have no difficulty in securing any terms they wanted in bilateral agreements. It, therefore, appeared be more satisfactory from the Foreign Office point of view that the matter should be regulated in the peace treaties, since Britain should then at least know what concessions the Russians secured and would have some *locus standi* for displaying an interest in the matter.

There was some discussion of the relevance of this question to the intention of British military to maintain military installations in Italy. According to the Foreign Office meeting view "there could be no question of foregoing any advantage we might secure in Italy in the faint hope that this would induce the Russians to be less exacting in their demands on the Balkan countries concerned, but it was felt that in our Italian negotiations we should at least bear in mind the importance of avoiding, where possible, precedents which the Russians could quote as justifying their continued military control of the Balkan."⁴

By June 1945, the U.S. State Department insisted on the reorganisation of Rumanian and Bulgarian governments and free election as early as possible. These were prerequisites for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of peace treaties. The United States supported with reservation the British proposal for the early conclusion of peace. They refused to conclude peace with the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments in office, even if this step accelerated the withdrawal of Soviet troops. After consulting the U.S. representatives in Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, the State Department did not even believe that "conclusion of peace would necessarily result in withdrawal of Russian troops, especially if real political authority remains in the hands of communists."⁵

The State Department's "general approach to the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary" (a document written immediately after the Potsdam Conference) wanted to avoid a punitive peace settlement. The Americans believed that "war guilt" clauses, unjustified territorial amputations and undue military, political or economic restrictions would not be included in the treaties. It was hoped by this policy to avoid the division of the Central European and Balkan region into irreconcilable groups of "status quo" and "revisionist" states, which was one of the consequences of the last peace settlement, that explains why Southeastern Europe fell so easily under German domination. The State Department believed "that general security in the Danubian-

⁴ *Foreign Office* (Public Record Office - PROFO) 371.48192R 10059. Contains a summary of the Debate in the British Foreign Office on June 7, 1945.

⁵ FO.371.48192R 10742, 10766, 10768/81/67 11658/5063/67 *FRUS*, The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. I p. 381, pp. 399-400.

Balkan area can be better secured by the United Nations Organisation and by regional arrangements which are in conformity with the United Nations Charter than by specific treaty restrictions on the military establishments or on the industries of the ex-satellite states.”⁶

The Soviet revealed their military peace aims concerning Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary at the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London on September 11, 1945. Molotov insisted on discussing the draft peace treaties concerning Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania “as one and the same question”.⁷ The Council of Foreign Ministers accepted in the case of Italy the British-American draft peace treaty as a basis of negotiations. For the other cases (Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland), in turn, the Soviet draft was used to serve this purpose. This indicates the decisive role played in the peace settlement by the great power(s), who dictated the document of capitulation, and controlled the armistice. Under the Soviet proposal, the text of the armistices served as a basis for the peace treaties. Apart from a general disarmament clause, the Soviets avoided to discuss the withdrawal of Allied (Soviet) troops and to detail the limitation of Balkan land, sea and air forces!

The delegation of Great-Britain submitted its proposals for a peace treaty with Rumania and Bulgaria on September 17, 1945 and with Hungary on the next day.

The United Kingdom delegation agreed with the Soviet delegation that the relevant articles of the Armistice with Rumania (and Hungary) signed at Moscow provided a basis for the drafting of certain parts of the treaty of peace with Rumania (and Hungary), and assumed “that on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty all Allied Forces will be withdrawn from Rumania (and Hungary) (except as may be provided for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Red Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria).”⁸

Oddly enough, it was the British delegation which proposed the formula of stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania until the conclusion of Austrian State Treaty. (The Soviet troops remained, in fact, on Rumanian soil until July 1958, and in Hungary until June 1991). The British delegation proposed that the Peace Treaties should lay down the character and numbers of the armed forces which the Balkan States would be allowed to retain; should impose the necessary limitations upon the manufacture of war material in these states; and should provide for a small inter-Allied military inspectorate to supervise the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty in succession to the Allied Control Commission, which would be dissolved upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

The American delegation “suggested a directive to the deputies from the Council of Foreign Ministers to govern them in the drafting of a treaty of peace” with Rumania and Bulgaria submitted on September 19, 1945. On September 21, 1945 concerning Hungary, “the maintenance of armaments for land, sea and air will be closely restricted to the necessities of: (a) maintenance of order in Hungarian territory, (b) local frontier

⁶ Steven Kertész, *The last European peace conference, Paris 1946*, University Press of America, 1985, p. 70.

⁷ *FRUS 1945*, The Conference of Berlin II. pp. 112-1.

⁸ Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) (45)21 and (45)24.

defence, (c) such military contingents, if any, in addition to the foregoing as may be required by the Security Council.”⁹

The Council of Foreign Ministers debated the Rumanian draft on September 20, 1945. Molotov said that unlike Italy, Rumania was not a great power and had only fought against the Soviet Union. Rumania was not capable of maintaining a large army or a war-making potential which might threaten the peace of Europe. “Why then was it necessary to impose special restrictions on Rumania’s military establishment? To restrict her armaments and still more, to impose on her an Allied inspectorate, would restrict her sovereignty and hurt her pride, without bringing any special benefit to the Allied cause.”¹⁰

Bevin insisted on the establishment of an Allied inspectorate as a peace enforcement machinery and proposed that the smaller states should not be allowed to maintain armed forces larger than their economy could support. The sale of arms to small countries was also a potential source of danger. “Limitations of the armaments of the smaller powers would not only assist the national economy in those countries, but would limit the possibilities of another world war.”¹¹

Byrnes feared rivalry in armaments among the small nations, which would eventually lead to larger conflicts in which millions might be involved “Limitation of armaments would be the greatest boom to the Balkan peoples, whose economic condition was such that they could not maintain large armies and the same time restore the peace-time production which was essential to their economic health and happiness. If the great powers fulfilled their promise to prevent aggression through the United Nations Organisation, these countries would have no need of large armies.”¹²

After this discussion, the Council agreed that the American proposal should be accepted as a basis for detailed study of this question. The latter should include the question of whether any machinery was required (either in the form of an Allied inspectorate or otherwise) for enforcing any restrictions which might be decided to impose on Rumania’s military establishment. The Council also accepted the British proposal about the withdrawal of Allied forces (with L/C with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria) on September 21, 1945. The Foreign Ministers agreed to withdraw *all* Allied Forces from Bulgaria on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.¹³ These decisions became the basic authority for the subsequent military discussions and the American formula was tacitly accepted as covering also Hungary and Finland.

The Withdrawal of Allied Troops Versus the Recognition of Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments

It was evident after the London Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers that Italy would to some extent form a precedent for the other treaties. The British and Americans could not hope to get army restrictions imposed in the Balkan treaties if they had not

⁹ CFM (45) 36,35,40.

¹⁰ PROFO.CAB 133.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

gotten them for the Italian Treaty. Early on, it became evident that the Russians were reluctant to agree to changes in the Italian Treaty which might be used against their interests in the Balkans. This particularly applied to machinery for Treaty enforcement.¹⁴

After the failure of the London session, Secretary of State James Byrnes initiated the continuation of peace talks in Moscow (December 15-27, 1945). Bevin and Byrnes informally discussed the Southeast European situation as well. At these talks with Molotov, Bevin urged the withdrawal of all Allied troops from the Balkans and also the reduction of the Austrian occupation forces. At the same time, the British Foreign Secretary resisted the idea to withdraw their troops from Greece and considered that Bulgarian army with Soviet support represented a serious threat to their security interest.

Bevin wanted to obtain the demobilisation of the Bulgarian army, and the withdrawal of Allied troops from Hungary and Poland. Molotov reminded the Foreign Secretary that the Red Army had withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, and that the presence of the Red Army in these countries had in no way hampered the extension of popular will.

On December 23 1945, Stalin explained to Byrnes that Soviet troops did not exercise pressure on elections in the Balkan countries, for example "in Hungary there were Soviet troops and in actual fact the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it wanted there, but that nevertheless the elections had resulted in a victory for a party other than the Communist party. This demonstrates that the Soviet Union was exercising no pressure through its troops in the countries. All the Soviet Union asks of these border states in proximity to the Soviet Union was that they should not be hostile."¹⁵

Following this discussion, the three Foreign Ministers agreed that their governments should advise Rumanian King Michael that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the government. The Rumanian Government, thus reorganised, should declare that free elections will be held as soon as possible. A.I. Vyshinski, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr were authorised as a Commission to proceed immediately to Bucharest to execute the above-mentioned tasks. As soon as these were accomplished and the required assurances were received, the government of Rumania was recognised by the United States and the United Kingdom at the beginning of February 1946.

The Soviet Government took upon itself the mission of giving "friendly advice" to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the inclusion in the latter's government of an additional two representatives from other democratic groups. After the failure of negotiating to broaden the Bulgarian Government, the recognition was postponed until after the peace talks.

The framework of the military clauses negotiations established at the Potsdam Conference and at the London and Moscow meetings, made the beginning of the expert discussions possible. The London Session of Deputies started work on the Military

¹⁴ Chief of Staff Committee (C.O.S. (47)67). *Report by the Service advisers to the United Kingdom delegation at the Paris Conference on the Peace Treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland on May 29, 1947.* (Hereafter Dove-Braithwaite report).

¹⁵ F.o. CAB 133. A conversation on 23rd December at the Kremlin between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Byrnes.

Clauses in January 1946. A few articles were adopted with little discussion, but it became evident that most of them would require expert examination and the Naval, Military and Air and Joint Sub-Committees were set up accordingly and the relevant clauses referred to them. Thereafter reference to the Deputies was only made when agreed articles were put to them for final confirmation, or when agreement could not be reached on the service level.¹⁶

The Negotiations of the Military Clauses of the Balkan Treaties in 1946¹⁷

The discussion of the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian peace treaties started in March - April 1946 in the London Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Joint Committee of the military and air representatives negotiated the military clauses, and closely followed the Italian precedent.

The Deputy Foreign Ministers presented the first draft of the Rumanian Military Clauses on the 1st April 1946. The American proposal served on a basis for the limitation for the size of forces. The U.S. delegation wanted to reduce these forces to minimum level, still sufficient for the maintenance of order, local frontier defence and military contingents required by the UN Security Council. The British and American military representatives presented draft articles, but the Soviet delegation refused to accept the limitation of Rumanian forces. After May 7th, 1946 the shorter Soviet draft articles were taken as a basis for discussions. As compared to the Italian Military Clauses, the Soviets tried to obtain more lenient terms for Rumania and Bulgaria. The time limit for disbandment of excess forces, the prohibition of extraneous service training, the prohibition on excess war material, the disposal of excess war material, the duration of military limitations, the return of prisoners of war, the definition of military, air and naval training, the definition and list of war material in a shorter form, contained the same wording as in the Italian Peace Treaty.

The Soviet delegation wanted to avoid the numerical limitation of the Rumanian army. In the presentation of the armed forces of this country, the strength of the army was deliberately underestimated. The Americans pointed out that the Rumanian army's size could not exceed the relative strength of Italian army in comparison to her population, but nevertheless taking into account that the Rumanian land frontiers were relatively longer than the Italian ones. The British delegation tried to obtain equal strength for the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian Armed forces. As a matter of general policy, the British side did not want to allow Bulgaria larger forces than the Greek army and tended to reduce the ceilings for the Balkan states to a minimum in order to avoid producing counter-arguments for the Soviet Union to cut down the Italian army.

The negotiation lasted a long time on the question of minimum requirements for

¹⁶ C.O.S. (47)67. Dove-Braithwaite Report.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

maintaining internal order and local defence of the frontiers. The American and British delegation succeeded to separate the limitation of anti-aircraft personnel from the army and frontier guards. The Soviets finally agreed to reduce the strength of Rumanian army by one third (compared to the estimate strength in the Spring of 1946) i.e. 120,000, and to 5,000 the anti aircraft personnel. These figures represented a compromise between the American (100,000), British (50-75,000) and Soviet (174,000) proposals and created an important precedent for the negotiations of Bulgarian and Hungarian army limitations.

In the limitation of Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian air forces, the Soviet delegation argued to restrict these forces to the needs of defending local frontiers and the maintaining internal order. As the Soviet Union considered limiting the number of aircraft as superfluous, they required only a limitation of air force personnel. The British and American delegations compared the size of population, area of country, the number of vital centres to be defended between Italy and the Balkan countries and proposed the prohibition of bombers. In the discussions of the Rumanian case, the British attempted to reduce the air force to the minimum. They hoped to establish a precedent for Bulgaria, an all important issue for the protection of British interests in Greece.

At the end, the Soviet Union accepted a limit of 8000 men and 150 aircraft. The Naval discussions followed the same pattern. After discussions the Soviets agreed to limit the Rumanian Navy to 5000 men and 15,000 tons and accepted the British and American arguments to eliminate submarines torpedo-boats and special assault crafts.

The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian peace treaties omitted the restriction of some special weapons: the limitation 30 km -range guns and the abolition of motor torpedo boats that have been included in the Italian Treaty. In the first case, the American and British delegations accepted the Soviet argument that the Balkan countries had neither the engineering ability nor the capacity to make such guns. The motor torpedo boats, on a French initiative, were mentioned in the Italian Peace Treaty. At the Paris Conference, Italy and Greece both contested the absence of the prohibition of such special assault crafts in the Balkan treaties. The Soviet Union, after long discussions, finally accepted this amendment. The prohibition of atomic weapons, included at the Paris Conference, in the Italian Treaty, were applied to the other treaties as well.

The withdrawal of Allied forces (Article 21 of the Rumanian Peace Treaty) was the most important military clause which limited the sovereignty of this country. This question was neither mentioned in the British draft of the Italian Peace Treaty nor in the Soviet draft of the Rumanian and Hungarian peace treaties. The British intended to retain lines of communications through Italy to Austria so long as the British occupational forces remained in the latter country. At the September 1945 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, agreement was reached that Allied forces would be withdrawn from Rumania, except for those needed for the Soviet lines of communications to Austria and would be withdrawn *in toto* from Bulgaria.

At the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation indicated that they might go back on their agreement over Bulgaria and leave troops ostensibly on a line of communication to Austria. Molotov linked the Soviet withdrawal from Bulgaria with the Allied troops withdrawal from Italy.

In the ensuing discussions, the British pointed out that the British Zone in Austria had no connection with other British occupied territory, and that Bulgaria is not on the direct route to Austria from Soviet territory. The Americans, after this meeting, granted the necessary facilities to supply the British troops in Austria through the United States Zone in Germany. On 20th June 1946, the Soviet Foreign Minister finally gave up this position and agreed to Allied withdrawal within 90 days from both countries.

The military articles of the Bulgarian Treaty closely followed the corresponding articles of the Rumanian Treaty. The Great power agreed that the clauses of the Balkan and the Finnish peace treaties should be similar. The only differences concerned the Articles of the strength of the Bulgarian army, anti-aircraft personnel, air force, and navy, and the restrictions on Bulgarian frontier fortifications.

The application of the Rumanian precedent i.e., the reduction of army strength in the same proportion to the population as that of Rumania, resulted in a Bulgarian army of about 45,000. The British were anxious to limit Bulgarian forces well below those planned for Greece and argued that the forces allowed to them should bear a reasonable relation to their population, size, frontier and European status. The Soviet delegation insisted that no quantitative restrictions on the Balkan states and Finland were necessary. Molotov argued that relative to her population, Bulgaria had longer frontiers than Rumania and therefore needed a relatively larger army to defend them. The American and British delegations accepted to raise the strength of the Bulgarian army - including frontier guards - to 55,000. The British and American experts aimed to prevent Bulgaria from waging a war of aggression against Greece by assuring a modicum of goodwill from Bulgaria to implement the Military Clauses. They disregarded the fact that Bulgaria played a key role in the Soviet Mediterranean Strategy and never applied the initially planned reductions after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Bulgaria.

The drafting powers examined the sizes of the Bulgarian and Hungarian air forces together. The British and Americans contended that the Bulgarian and Rumanian air forces should bear the same relation to each other as did their armies. Only then did the Soviet delegation realise that their agreement over Rumania created a precedent and was going to make it difficult for them to secure what they regarded as an adequate air force for Bulgaria. They raised the figure to 5200 men and 90 aircraft from 5000 men and 52 aircraft (5000 for Hungary), but the Soviet Senior Air Adviser, General Belov, had clear political instructions that Bulgaria was to receive better treatment than Hungary, and a larger air force than Greece. The Americans succeeded in reducing the number of Bulgarian combat aircraft to 70.

In the same way, unlike in the case of Rumania and Finland, the Soviets fought for six weeks in Paris over the size of the Bulgarian navy, for which they proposed a tonnage about ten times their pre-war strength. Finally a size half this figure was agreed upon.

At the Paris Conference (July 29th - October 15th, 1946) the Greeks sought to restrict Bulgarian frontier fortifications on the same wording as in the Italian Peace Treaty. A similar amendment to the Hungarian Treaty forwarded by Czechoslovakia had the Soviet support. The Americans and British reluctantly accepted the principle of limiting frontier fortifications. The Greeks at this moment introduced the question of frontier *rectification*.

The linkage of these questions made it possible for the Americans to use the fortification issue as a consolation prize. The American and British delegations therefore argued that the great powers could not deny to a small ally (Greece) what they had already given to larger ones (France and Yugoslavia). The Soviet delegation contested this, stating that a small country (Bulgaria) could not be treated on the same basis as a large country (Italy). In the final session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (November 4th - December 12th, 1946), the Soviet delegation finally withdrew their objection to the proposed frontier rectifications.

The Greeks presented these claims to advance their frontier to the North for military considerations at the expense of Bulgaria in Macedonia and Thrace. At the instigation of the Soviets, the Bulgarians put in a counter-claim for part of Thrace, including the port of Dedeagach. The Americans opposed firmly both claims, and the British initially supported the Greek claim. The Military Commission of the Paris Conference implicitly recognised that the Greek frontier rectification proposal will not improve overall security of the region, only the possibilities of local defence of that country. The Bulgarian political commission of the Paris Conference defeated the Greek proposal, and finally the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to refuse any frontier modification.

As mentioned, the negotiations of the Hungarian Military Clauses closely followed the Bulgarian model. The Soviet Union reduced the Hungarian army to 25,000 in 1945. In the discussions, the British tried to apply the principle of relating the size of the army to the population and proposed 70,000 men in order to exceed the size of Bulgarian army. The Americans moved for the number of 60,000 men. Surprisingly, the Soviets closed at 65,000, including anti-aircraft and river flotilla personnel. The strength of the Hungarian Air Force, as already described, was somewhat less than the Bulgarian Air Force.

Article 15 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, as in the other Balkan and Finnish treaties, limited the special naval weapons. The report by the service advisers to the United Kingdom delegation, Brigadier A.J.H. Dove and Group-Captain F. J. Sr. G. Braithwaite explained the inclusion of this article in the following way:

“Odd though this may seem, since Hungary has no navy, it was not the result of careless drafting. The article is designed partly as a precaution to hinder German rearmament, as well as to restrict the forces of the ex-enemy country itself. Experimental work on torpedoes, special assault craft and small submarines can well be carried out on inland waters, such as Lake Balaton and submarines can be constructed in sections and moved by rail to a port for assembly. The references to naval weapons are thus of some value.”¹⁸

The Implementation of the Military Clauses of the Peace Treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

At the moment of entry into force of the peace treaties, the Balkan countries started from different level of strength of the armed forces. The British Military estimated that

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Hungary had a 15,000 men army (including 7,000 Frontier Guards), 25,000 men in the security troops; Bulgaria 60 - 70,000 army, 10,000 frontier guards, 100,000 militia; and Rumania's army strength attained 100,000 men, 20,000 frontier guards and 32.000 gendarmerie. The British tried, in vain, to eliminate Soviet troops from Rumania and Hungary, concomitantly with the Anglo-American withdrawal from Italy on December 15, 1947. They argued that there was no military justification for the Soviet position since the shortest and by far the most efficient means of communication between Russia and Austria lies along the railway route through Southern Poland and Czechoslovakia. The British and Americans failed to obtain a limitation on the number of Russian troops.

From the very beginning, the fulfilment of the Military Clauses of the Balkan Treaties was governed by Soviet wishes. The Soviet government defeated all efforts of the American and British to make the tripartite Minister's Council (Article 39 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, Article 37 of the Rumanian and Article 35 of the Bulgarian Treaties) an effective control body. The Soviets had entire responsibility for their unilateral actions, pursuing the build-up of their military alliance. The Americans and British were circumvented to ensure that the armed strengths officially maintained in these countries did not exceed limits laid down in the treaties, and kept themselves informed by undertaking inspections. In the case of Hungary and Rumania, the British and Americans also failed to ensure that the location of the Soviet troops would be limited to the Soviet lines of communications.

The Americans and British had no real lever to use against these governments and dropped the idea of bringing an effective case against Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, because they evaded treaty obligations with the Soviet support. Italy's integration in the North Atlantic Alliance made it difficult to circumvent Soviet veto and obstruction. The ensuing violations are demonstrated by the history of the Hungarian implementation of the military articles. Most probably, Rumania and Bulgaria followed exactly the same pattern.

The Fulfillment of the Military and Aviation Clauses of the Hungarian Peace Treaty¹⁹

With the signing of the Hungarian Peace Treaty and its parliamentary ratification the legal ground for the development of the Hungarian army was created, and the progressive establishment of the armed forces could begin. The Ministry of Defence wanted to create the 65,000 strong Hungarian army permitted by the Peace Treaty, through a long-run, well-considered development plan, keeping in mind the economic potential of the country. In the preparatory period of the development (1947-1951), the aim was to bring about the army's training and educational frame, the new democratic professional officer and non-commissioned officer staff with high professional knowledge. At the end of preparatory period, the planned strength of the army would have reached 35,000 men.²⁰

¹⁹ I would like to thank the contribution of Imre Okv  th (Research Fellow - Institute of Military History, Budapest).

²⁰ *Military History Archivum* (MHA). "Documents of the Supervisor of the Hungarian Army" (DSHA) 16. box, p. 141.

The progressive build-up plan of the army changed from September 1947 due to the turns in foreign and home politics. Coming home from the session of the Cominform, Mihály Farkas and József Révai suggested in their memorandum to the Political Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party -- among other things -- the revision of the views on the progressive establishment of the armed forces. The new development plan (January 1948) -- worked out mainly by the Communist Party -- thought that the size of the well trained, well equipped new army could be achieved in four years (1 October 1948-1 October 1952). The idea of exceeding the peace strength of 65,000 first arose during the working out of the plan, because this number -- as a basis for mobilisation -- was considered small. Taking into account Hungary's population, the country could have been able to set up an army of 1 million mobilised men. At a time of mobilisation -- taking into account the triplication of certain units -- the army of 1 million men could be achieved from an army of 300,000 men (the first step of mobilisation). To achieve this a peace strength of 100,000 would have been needed.²¹

From Spring 1949, the Hungarian political and military leadership -- in agreement with Stalin's views on the international situation -- considered American preparations for the third world war as the main reason for the progressive build up of the armed forces. It became the conviction of the Hungarian party leadership that in a few years the United States would start a war against the Soviet Union and the so-called people's democracies. For this reason -- in accordance with Soviet wishes -- it decided to speed up the progressive build-up of the armed forces and lift the number and combat formations. As a major objective, it wished to reach a military potential needed to block the feared "imperialist" attack and be victorious, to establish a large mass army with conventional weapons. In order to achieve this, they changed the earlier development plan in such a way that these goals could be reached by the end of 1951.²²

On the 16th of November 1949, the decision of the Cominform, which listed Yugoslavia among the aggressive imperialistic countries preparing for war, changed Hungarian military politics too. From this time on, the Hungarian army's main task was to block a supposed attack coming from Yugoslavia and to organise a successful and effective counterattack. In the atmosphere of war psychosis -- seeking to reach the needed mobilisation standard of the Hungarian army as soon as possible, the higher political-military leadership was not concerned with the military clauses of the Peace Treaty nor with keeping them.

Under the shadow of military confrontation, it was not in the interests of the great powers to check if there was strict compliance with the Peace Treaty. Moreover, it did not make sense to take sanctions against those countries that were their satellites; as for those countries that were not satellites, there was no possibility to do so. Thus, the possible non-compliance with the Peace Treaty clauses were, probably, implicitly understood.

For the first time, the Hungarian army violated the Peace Treaty in September/October 1948 when it bought and set up 102 various aircraft from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union²³ (Point b., of Article 12. allowed 90 aircraft, 70 combat aircraft).

²¹ MHA. DSHA. 4. box, pp. 100-101.

²² MHA. Ministry of Defence (MD) Subdepartment for Equipment Planning (SEP) 1949, box 137.

²³ MHA. Symposium (S) II. - II/E-1/a p. 7.

Article 14 was also disregarded. This Article forbids the military training of personnel not serving in the army and the military preliminary training. On the 19th of October 1948, the head of the training department of the Ministry of Defence informed the headquarters of the Hungarian army to start training outside the army. This happened through the militarily important (technical) sports, of which the directing branch became the technical department of the National Sport Office. With its leadership the technical sports were done through the Popular League of the Hungarian Youth and the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Alliance. Inside the Hungarian army matters in connection with these were dealt with by the Department of Training and Sports and Special Field Officers assigned to the regional commands.

In 1950, the Council of Ministers ordered universities and colleges and also party college training of outside troops in order to supply the needed amount of reserve officers.²⁴

The allowed strength of the army was surpassed at the end of 1950 (87,900 men); and in 1952 they reached the largest strength of the army so far with 202,545 men. The strength of the Hungarian army between January 1953 and January 1956 moved from 120,000 to 186,000.²⁵ An important decrease came about after the 1956 October Revolution: the strength of the army at the beginning of the 1957 was around 88,000 men.²⁶ After the transitional period (1957-1960) and to developments started according to the needs of the Warsaw Treaty, the strength of the Hungarian army (1960-1990) was around 130-140,000 men. Today it is 105,000 men.

The authorised number of 5,000 was not kept either at the air force, since this was 10-14,000 men between 1951-1956. The number of aircraft during this period varied from 200 to 500, including the prohibited bombers too.²⁷

In 1951 with the setting up of 12 M-13 (Katyusha) multiple rocket launchers within the 66th Multiple Rocket Launcher Brigade, the specifications of the 15th Article were also disregarded. The brigade was reorganised in November 1953 -- in accordance to the government programme of July 1953 -- to a regiment and later, in the Autumn of 1954, it was requalified into a trench-mortar regiment under the 5th Motorised Rifle Division.²⁸ This type was concentrated into central stock in 1956 and later exported. A newer, theatre fire-power and larger range multiple rocket launcher, the BM-21, was introduced in the Hungarian People's Army in 1969.²⁹

The medium range SZA-75 M (Dvina) air defence rocket system was set up in the air defence system in 1959 which was in service from the 19th May 1961.³⁰ The MIG-19 type fighter of the air force was equipped with rockets also in this year.³¹

²⁴ MHA. MD. Presidium (P) 2948. 41728; MD Secretariat (S) 1951. 1. box, p. 75.

²⁵ MHA. 102/05/315.; MDP. 1949 - 303.314.

²⁶ MHA. MD. SEP. 1957. 187. box.

²⁷ From 1953 there were 59 TU-2 medium bombers in the air force, see MHA. 102/05/315.

²⁸ Keeping the 12 rocket-launchers.

²⁹ MHA. S. II. 330/047/V.-5. p. 21 and p. 27-28.; IV/B-3/b. p. 46 and pp. 102-103. In 1970 there were 32 BM-21; in 1973 and 1980 there were 66 of these.

³⁰ MHA. S. II. IV/B-4 pp. 18-21.

³¹ MHA. S. II. II/E-1/a. p. 89.

The RPG-2 anti-tank rocket-launchers appeared at the motorised rifle units in 1960 (6 in 1960; 1003 in 1965). The later model, the RPG-7 was put into service from 1965. This had an optical sight, longer penetrating power and larger reach.³² The SZPG-9 D type platformed grenade launcher was introduced in 1966 (in 1970 177; in 1975 287; in 1980 269).³³

Experiments were made from 1952 to work out ways for passive defence against an atomic attack. With the help of the Institute on Military Technique, a research group worked on a device with which the same effect could be achieved on a small area as on a larger one with an atomic bomb. The aim of the experiments was to obtain information for the organisation of defence against an atomic attack (what material should be used for shelters, how thick the walls should be and also measuring the level of radiation on the field, on machines, etc.).³⁴

By 1952, the Hungarian arms production provided small arms, artillery weapons and mortars and the optical and other artillery instruments needed for the Hungarian army including the mobilisation stocks. This meant violation of Article 16 which said that above the quantity needed for equipping an army of 65,000 men, Hungary is not allowed to keep or produce military equipment.

Finally it is possible to say that Hungary -- as a member of the Soviet led military alliance -- in order to prepare for war and to strengthen the military potential of the Hungarian army violated most of the military and aviation clauses of the Peace Treaty. This violation of the Treaty happened under the influence of the Soviet Union.

The implementation of the military clauses of the peace treaties became impossible because the establishment of Atlantic and Soviet alliances impeded from one side Italy, on the other side Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, to fulfil their obligations. The disunity of anti-fascist Allies led to the Cold War. The Soviet Union forced her small allies to violate the military clauses of the peace treaties. At the same time, the non-conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty helped the Soviets to maintain an unlimited number of Soviet troops in Rumania and Hungary. The Americans and British had no possibility to control or enforce treaty -implementation. They upheld the entry of those countries in the United Nations until 1955, but they were forced to give up protests for the violation of human rights and military clauses, because the Soviets were in effective control.

The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian governments never tried to formally revise the military clauses of the peace treaties, even after the precedent created by the Finnish and Austrian diplomacy. The debate about the contents of the peace-treaties was "frozen" for decades. Only the dramatic changes in 1989-1992 in Central and Eastern Europe re-opened the question of the European peace settlement after the Second World War.

³² In 1965 1732; in 1970 1832; in 1975 1679; in 1980 1655.

³³ MHA. S. II. IV/B-3/b. pp. 100-102.

³⁴ MHA. MD. S. 1952. 2. box, p. 196-197.